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A	DUTY	TO	RESIST:	WHEN	DISOBEDIENCE	SHOULD	BE	UNCIVIL	by	CANDICE	
DELMAS		
(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	2018,	295	pp.,	hb	£19.99)	
	
Civil	 disobedience	 has	 been	 a	 stale	 topic	 for	 legal	 theorists	 in	 recent	
decades.	 John	Rawls’	 classical	 formulation,	with	 its	 requirements	 for	 publicity,	
nonviolence	and	the	acceptance	of	legal	punishment	on	behalf	of	the	dissenter,	is	
old	 rope	 in	 countless	 academic	 tugs-of-war	 between	 traditionalist	 and	 more	
expansionist	 approaches,	 without	 much	 distance	 being	 made	 on	 any	 side.1	
Nowadays,	a	more	interesting	approach	has	been	to	examine	disobedience	writ	
large.	In	the	context	of	anti-fracking	activism	in	the	UK,	the	gilets	jaunes	protests	
in	 France	 and	 Occupy	movements	 internationally,	 the	 politics	 of	 disobedience	
are	as	 relevant	now	as	 they	were	during	Rawls’	 time,	 in	 the	era	of	 the	US	civil	
rights	movement	and	anti-Vietnam	war	protests.	The	theoretical	groundwork	for	
framing	 these	 modern	 protests,	 however,	 needs	 to	 catch	 up	 with	 their	
transnational	 and	 antagonistic	 potential.	 Candice	 Delmas’	 theory	 for	 justifying	
‘principled	 resistance,’	 which	 may	 include	 secrecy,	 evasiveness	 and	 even	
violence,	is	therefore	a	welcome	contribution	that	reinvigorates	the	topic,	drags	
it	into	the	21st	century,	and	indeed	threatens	to	turn	it	on	its	head	entirely.		
Fundamentally,	 Delmas	 asks	why	we	 obey	 the	 law	 in	 the	 first	 place.	 She	
identifies	 several	 grounds	 of	 political	 obligation	 that	 generate	moral	 duties	 of	
obedience	 to	 law	 and	 authority.	 She	 samples	 four	 recurring	 arguments	 for	 the	
‘duty	to	obey,’	which	feature	throughout	Western	political	theory:	namely,	these	
are	duties	to	justice,	duties	to	fairness,	the	‘Samaritan	duty’	to	those	in	need,	and	
the	duty	to	preserve	dignity	within	our	political	association	(p.	5).		
Each	ground	for	obligation,	she	argues,	can	generate	duties	to	obey	the	law:	
but,	should	those	moral	grounds	be	threatened	by	an	unfair	or	unjust	law,	they	
conversely	 generate	 duties	 of	 disobedience	 and	 resistance	 to	 that	 law.	 The	
ground	of	fairness,	for	example,	leads	us	to	obey	laws	of	a	fairly,	democratically-
elected	 legislature;	 the	 same	 principle,	 however,	 might	 require	 passive	
disobedience	should	a	law	prove	unfair	in	its	treatment	of	minorities.	The	moral	
duty	 to	 obey	 is	 therefore	 defeasible.	 The	 US	 civil	 rights	 movement	 has	
historically	 been	 considered	 the	 epitome	 of	 this	 reasoning,	 with	 relation	 to	
peaceful	civil	disobedience.		
But	 further,	 Delmas	 argues,	 the	 fundamental	 requirement	 of	 fairness	
creates	duties	 to	 actively	disobey	 and	 resist	 such	 laws,	 even	 to	pursue	 ‘uncivil	
disobedience,’	 and	 to	 break	 ancillary	 laws	 to	 do	 so.	 Where	 for	 example	 ICE	
agents	 seek	 unjustly	 to	 gather	 undocumented	 migrants	 and	 subject	 them	 to	
appalling	 conditions,	 citizens	 are	 duty-bound	 to	 assess	what	 action	 they	must	
take,	 which	 may	 include	 direct	 unlawful	 action	 and	 ‘principled	 disobedience’	
such	as	providing	sanctuary	or	deceiving	enforcement	agents.	The	very	grounds	
for	 obedience	 are	 used	 to	 justify	 disobedience	 in	 pursuit	 of	 the	 same	
fundamental	 moral	 imperatives.	 Delmas	 thus	 creates	 a	 coherent	 theory	 for	
political	obligations	to	resist	unjust	laws	and	social	structures.		
The	 elegance	 of	 her	 argument	 is	 that	 it	 takes	 received	understandings	 of	
political	obligation,	and	detaches	them	from	an	uncritical	presumption	towards	
duties	of	obedience,	which	has	been	the	legacy	of	Rawls’	model	for	decades.	The	
																																																								
1	J.	Rawls,	A	Theory	of	Justice	(1999,	rev.	ed.)	320	
four	 fundamental	 grounds	 for	 obligation	 she	 explores	 in	 the	main	 body	 of	 her	
book	 (and	 she	 accepts	 that	 there	 may	 be	 others	 to	 consider)	 are	 reasons	 for	
action	 per	 se,	 not	 merely	 reasons	 for	 obedience	 or	 dissent.	 Her	 four	 main	
chapters	(Chapters	3-6)	detail	each	moral	ground,	 its	role	in	civil	disobedience,	
and	its	role	in	principled	resistance,	giving	historical	examples	ranging	from	the	
Attica	 prison	 uprising	 through	 to	 Edward	 Snowden’s	 data	 leaks	 and	
whistleblowing,	to	illustrate	her	reasoning.	
Delmas	 avoids	 unnecessary	 semantic	 pedantry	 and	 cuts	 directly	 to	 the	
substance	of	what	moral	obligations	must	entail.	These	broad	moral	concepts	are	
inescapably	debatable	in	definition	and	scope	–	Delmas	does	not	waste	any	time	
trying	 to	 pin	 down	 ‘justice’	 (p.	 75).	 However,	 by	 looking	 instead	 to	 received	
understandings	 of	 what	 might	 evidently	 be	 called	 injustices,	 such	 as	 official	
misconduct	or	deliberate	disrespect	for	the	equality	of	citizens,	Delmas	drives	a	
persuasive	 and	 relatable	 argument	 through	 what	 might	 otherwise	 be	
treacherously	broad,	hazy	territory.			
Delmas	 preempts	 several	 potential	 criticisms,	 including	 concerns	 that	
principled	disobedience	is	undemocratic,	 threatens	social	order,	and	endangers	
the	 civility	 that	 ‘binds	 society	 together’	 (p.	 50).	 These	 are	 not	 uncommon	
criticisms	 against	 even	 peaceful	 civil	 disobedience,	 but	 are	 particularly	 acute	
where	uncivil	and	even	violent	action	may	be	initiated	by	aggrieved	individuals	
and	groups.	Recent	commentary	on	the	gilets	jaunes	protests	suggests	this	‘social	
fabric’	 argument	 is	 as	 pertinent	 in	 Europe	 now	 as	 it	 was	 in	 1960’s	 America.	
However,	 again,	 she	 adroitly	 turns	 these	 concerns	 on	 their	 heads.	 Unjust	 and	
unfair	laws	threaten	a	healthy	democracy,	possibly	more	than	subsequent	acts	of	
resistance	can.	Principled	disobedience	may	well	contribute	to	strengthening	the	
rule	 of	 law	 and	 civic	 society,	 under	 a	 just	 and	 fair	 democratic	 regime.	 Indeed,	
purely	 peaceful	 disobedience	 may	 be	 ineffective	 at	 communicating	 dissent,	
pursuing	change,	effecting	democratic	dialogue,	or	preventing	immediate	harms	
resulting	 from	egregious	state	policy.	 	Uncouple	 the	 fundamental	moral	 reason	
for	 action	 from	 a	 dogmatic	 duty	 to	 obey,	 and	 one	 can	 apply	 it	 just	 as	 well	 to	
duties	to	disobey.		
In	 another	 deviation	 from	 traditional,	 tired	 debates	 on	 disobedience,	
Delmas	 expressly	 sidesteps	 thorny	 questions	 as	 to	 what	 renders	 a	 state	 a	
legitimate	 or	 illegitimate	 authority	 (p.	 10).	 Her	 focus	 is	 on	 fidelity	 not	 to	 just	
institutions	or	governments,	or	even	to	law,	but	solely	to	the	four	moral	reasons	
for	 action.	Notwithstanding	 this	 sidestep,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	draw	some	powerful	
contrasts	between	her	thesis	and	established	theories	of	legitimacy,	such	as	Raz’s	
service	 conception	 of	 authority.2	 Briefly	 stated,	 Raz	 conceives	 of	 authority	 as	
being	legitimate	to	the	extent	that	it	 is	based	on	pre-existing	reasons	for	action	
(which	 could	 include	 justice,	 fairness	 and	 the	 rest),	 and	 that	 the	 authority	 in	
question	 is	 best	 placed	 to	 facilitate	 those	 reasons	 for	 action.	Where	 this	 is	 the	
case,	a	law	becomes	a	‘content-independent,’	pre-emptive	reason	for	action,	even	
if	 misguided	 or	 itself	 morally	 questionable.	 The	 law	 then	 displaces	 the	
‘background’	moral	reasons	for	action	that	would	otherwise	for	Delmas	demand	
resistance,	according	to	individual	conscience.3		
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3	id.	
Delmas	 does	 not	 depend	 upon	 a	 conception	 of	 legitimacy	 in	 order	 to	 be	
persuasive:	 for	 her,	 the	 obligation	 to	 the	 fundamental	 moral	 reason	 is	
paramount,	and	legitimate	authority	begins	and	ends	with	it.	 It	would	however	
be	a	fascinating	exercise	to	contrast	this	theory	with	Delmas’	more	pronounced	
breakaway	 from	 the	 presumption	 of	 obedience.	 In	 part,	 this	 contrast	 matters	
because	 it	 informs	 how	 real-life	 social	 movements	 can	 conceive	 of	 their	
justifications.	 The	 ‘legitimation	 discourse’	 of	 protesters,	 and	 state	 responses,	
depends	upon	coherent	claims	being	made	as	to	what	renders	authority	morally	
intelligible.4	 If	 Delmas	 has	 short-circuited	 this	 cycle	 of	 legitimation	 claims	 and	
counterclaims,	 creating	 a	 solid	 argument	 for	 disobedience	 to	 specific	 policies	
notwithstanding	 whether	 the	 state	 is	 ‘mostly	 just,’	 it	 is	 a	 remarkable	
achievement	 and	 a	 powerful	 encouragement	 for	 social	 movements	
internationally.		
There	 are	 further,	more	practical	 considerations	 she	 addresses	 regarding	
systemic	injustices	and	our	‘Samaritan	duties.’	These	duties,	she	argues,	require	
us	to	assist	those	in	need,	but	not	merely	those	we	literally	walk	past:	it	includes	
those	 of	 whose	 plight	 we	 are	 aware,	 wherever	 they	 may	 be	 (p.	 148).	 This	
stretches	 the	 received	 understanding	 of	 the	 duty	 to	 include	 non-proximate	 or	
structurally-generated	 instances	 of	 harm,	 rather	 than	 those	 with	 which	 one	
makes	 direct	 contact.5	 Could	wide-ranging	 duties	 to	 combat	 all	 such	 injustices	
prove	 onerous,	 if	 not	 impossible,	 for	 citizens	 to	 fulfill?	 Where	 structural	
injustices	abound,	or	reach	overseas,	or	are	founded	on	a	colonial	history,	what	
level	 of	 resistance	 is	 expected	 from	 ordinary	 people	 to	 address	 these	
imbalances?	Examples	readily	spring	to	mind	of	climate	change	injustice	and	its	
differential	 effect	 on	 poorer	 populations.6	 In	 an	 increasingly	 globalised	 and	
interdependent	economy,	with	greater	knowledge	than	ever	of	the	consequences	
of	our	connectivity,	it	can	seem	a	significant	task	for	individual	citizens	to	be	able	
to	coherently	address	innumerable,	overlapping	social	injustices.	
Delmas	concedes	 that	 the	difficulties	attached	 to	duties	of	 resistance	may	
indeed	 be	 burdensome,	 but	 insists	 that	 this	 does	 not	 extinguish	 the	 duties	
themselves.	Rather,	they	require	fortitude,	collective	action	and	perseverance	in	
the	 face	 of	 systemic	 injustice	 (p.	 161).	 The	 law	 also	 generates	 onerous	
obligations,	but	we	expect	obedience	notwithstanding	those	burdens	due	to	the	
importance	of	the	underlying	moral	reasons	for	action:	why	not	apply	the	same	
logic	to	acts	of	resistance?	These	too	are,	after	all,	 ‘defeasible’	duties	(p.	9)	 in	a	
wider	moral	enquiry,	she	argues:	a	duty	to	 fight	 injustice	may	well	be	defeated	
by	other	pressing	moral	and	practical	 concerns,	and	may	not	create	a	constant	
and	 overbearing	 obligation	 to	 ‘take	 on	 the	 system’	 in	 its	 entirety,	 alone.	
Conversely,	 it	 is	 only	 by	 encouraging	 transnational	 social	 movements	 that	
democratic	 dialogue	 can	 be	 empowered.	 In	 the	 face	 of	 ‘democratic	 deficits’	
perceived	 in	 globalized	 neoliberal	 governance,	 environmentalist	 and	 social	
justice	 movements	 identify	 these	 broader	 duties	 and	 aim	 to	 gather	 solidarity	
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Spring	(2017)	
5	J.A.	Simmons	‘The	Duty	to	Obey	and	Our	Natural	Moral	Duties’	in	C.	H.	
Wellman	and	A.	J.	Simmons	(eds.),	Is	There	a	Duty	to	Obey	the	Law?	(2005)	
6	E.A.	Posner	and	D.Weisbach,	Climate	Change	Justice	(2007)	
transnationally.7	It	is	not	extraordinary	to	state	that	these	duties	do	exist	and	do	
matter.	 Delmas	 reflects	 the	 claims	 and	 narratives	 of	 these	 movements	 in	 her	
theory,	 and	 prises	 open	 simplistic,	 state-centric	 conceptions	 of	 protest	 to	
embrace	these	modern	challenges.		
There	is	the	perennial	question	throughout	of	how	to	decide	what	is	‘right.’	
Nobody	 is	 Ronald	 Dworkin’s	 metaphorical	 Hercules.8	 The	 individual,	 as	
adjudicator	of	their	moral	duty,	is	bound	to	make	mistakes:	potentially	grievous	
ones,	 in	 the	 event	 of	 violent	 action	 taking	 place.	 Delmas	 suggests	 that	 this	
difficulty	does	not	 repudiate	 the	duty	 itself,	no	 less	 than	 the	onerous	nature	of	
law-abidance	does	not	itself	morally	justify	illegality.	That	the	individual	may	err	
is	unavoidable	when	engaging	in	moral	enquiry.	It	is	better,	she	argues,	that	the	
enquiry	be	informed	and	sincere,	if	imperfect,	rather	than	abandoned	altogether	
in	favour	of	what	would	otherwise	be	morally	arbitrary	obedience.		
Linked	 to	 this	 is	 the	 question	 of	 methods,	 and	 degree,	 of	 retaliatory	
resistance.	 The	 ‘constraints’	 that	 Delmas	 suggests	 for	 resistors’	 actions	 should	
include	respecting	 the	 interests	of	other	 individuals,	 including	 life	and	physical	
integrity;	respecting	pluralism	and	non-denomination,	and	the	equal	standing	of	
all	 citizens	 regardless	 race,	 faith,	 and	 so	 on;	 and	 a	 respect	 for	 the	 system	 of	
fundamental	 rights	 within	 the	 constitutional	 order	 (p.	 48).	 This	 begs	 the	
question,	 what	 violence	 (if	 any)	 might	 be	 tolerable	 given	 these	 constraints?	
Delmas	 claims	 that	 ‘incivility	 does	 not	 necessarily	 violate	 people’s	 basic	
interests’	(p.	50).	Beyond	this	is	scope	for	violence	necessary	and	proportionate	
to	 addressing	 the	 injustice	 identified.	 Any	 violence	 should	 not	 be	 inconsistent	
with	 the	 foundational	moral	 reasons	 for	 action.	This	might	 exclude	violence	 to	
the	 person	 in	 most	 circumstances,	 but	 may	 include	 sabotage	 of	 property	 or	
police	equipment	 in	others.	Delmas	would	not	be	 the	 first	writer	 to	argue	 that	
use	 of	 violence	 may	 be	 a	 rational	 and	 morally	 justifiable	 tactic,	 when	 used	
proportionately	 for	 the	 public	 good.9	 There	 might	 arguably	 be	 a	 parallel	 to	
Dworkin	after	all,	in	that	the	action	taken	must	cohere	with	the	‘integrity’	of	the	
wider	political	public	morality,	notwithstanding	a	more	local	inconsistency	with	
the	broken	law	in	question.	The	question	of	what	violence	can	‘fit’	into	a	Western	
democracy,	 that	aspires	 towards	purely	peaceful	dialogue,	 is	more	than	merely	
of	theoretical	interest	given,	for	example,	Parisian	riots	of	2018.		
That	 actions	 should	be	proportionate	 to	 the	 injustice	 addressed,	with	 the	
least	harm	being	employed	to	attain	the	required	result,	is	an	injunction	which	is	
nevertheless	bound	to	raise	consequentialist	concerns.	Notably,	Arendt	wrote	of	
the	 unpredictability	 of	 long-term	 outcomes.10	 Violence,	 or	 leaking	 confidential	
information,	 could	 easily	 have	 unforeseeable	 adverse	 effects	 on	 the	 safety	 and	
wellbeing	of	citizens,	either	immediately	or	further	in	the	future.	This	is	certainly	
a	 feature	 of	 the	 commentary	 on	 whistleblowing	 activists,	 such	 as	 Assange	 or	
Snowden.	Delmas	 re-opens	 these	debates	within	 a	 fresh,	 contemporary	 setting	
while	reminding	us	that,	though	we	may	not	foresee	the	future	harms	caused	by	
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9	J.	Schwazmantel,	‘Democracy	and	Violence:	A	Theoretical	Overview’	(2010)	17	
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uncivil	 resistance,	 neither	 can	we	 predict	 the	 long-term	 harms	 of	 deferring	 to	
unfair	and	unjust	policies.	
The	 thesis	 also	 opens	 up	 possibilities	 to	 explore	 beyond	 the	 individual	
dissenter’s	 obligations,	 to	 address	 what	 the	 state	 must	 do	 to	 accommodate	
principled	 disobedience.	Moral	 justification	 rarely	 translates	 directly	 into	 legal	
justification.	 Delmas	 freely	 admits	 that	 this	 may	 be	 beyond	 the	 scope	 of	 her	
work,	and	subject	to	enormous	variation	across	regional	and	social	contexts:	she	
tentatively	 suggests	 a	 willingness	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	 police,	 prosecutors	 and	
judges	to	drop	prosecutions	against	acts	of	justifiable	resistance,	or	perhaps	the	
implementation	of	defences	based	on	the	grounds	of	the	obligation	in	question	–	
‘dignitary	 defences’,	 for	 example	 (p.	 70).	 The	 sincere	 moral	 convictions	 of	
defendants	 do	 seem,	 officially	 or	 otherwise,	 to	 be	 considered	 by	 judges	 at	
sentencing.	 The	 recent	 case	 of	 the	 ‘Stansted	 15’	 activists	 in	 the	 UK,	 who	
unlawfully	 obstructed	 deportation	 flights	 leaving	 the	 airport	 in	 2017,	
demonstrates	the	public	interest	in	these	concerns	within	contemporary	protest.	
Disobedience	 is	necessarily	a	crossover	point	between	social	 justice	claims	and	
criminal	justice	demands.	Delmas	leaves	open	the	ongoing	debate	on	how	much	
the	 state	 can	 justify	 punishing,	 or	 penalizing,	 these	 dissenters:	 and	 whether	
protesters	 who	 can	 demonstrate	 moral	 grounds	 for	 disobedience	 should	
willingly	accept	any	such	sanction.11		
The	book	presents	a	robust	but	simple	moral	reasoning	for	uncoupling	our	
political	obligations	from	a	presumed	duty	to	obey	–	and	one	strongly	relevant	to	
our	 times.	 The	 text	 is	 peppered	 with	 potent	 examples	 where	 uncivil	
disobedience	 has	 contributed	 to	 the	 pursuit	 of	 justice,	 from	 countless	 social	
movement	 groups	 in	 the	 20th	 century	 through	 to	 contemporary	 Black	 Lives	
Matter	protests.	We	are	reminded,	in	a	Postscript	relating	her	theory	to	‘the	Age	
of	 Trump,’	 of	 the	 powerful	 relevance	 and	 urgency	 to	 her	 claims,	 beyond	
philosophical	 armchair	 experimentation	 (p.	 229).	 She	 asks	 us	 to	 identify	 the	
injustices	around	us,	and	apply	her	theory	to	the	question	of	what	now	must	be	
done	 in	 the	 face	 of	 horrendous	 inequalities	 around	 us:	 not	 just	 relating	 to	 the	
Trump	administration,	but	elsewhere	across	the	US,	 the	EU,	and	beyond.	 It	 is	a	
fitting	epilogue	to	an	innovative	theory,	grounding	it	in	a	very	real,	modern	and	
daunting	setting,	and	asking	us	what	actions	we	must	take	to	counter	immediate	
injustice.		
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